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Left Parties and Trade Unions in France 
 
Abstract 
Historically, the supposed independence of unions from parties in France has been a myth, with 
the development of close relations between the CGT and the PCF on the one hand, and looser 
ones between the CFDT in particular, and the PS on the other. These links weakened from the 
1980s on, but appeared to be re-established, with some changes, when unions backed François 
Hollande in the 2012 presidential elections. The decline of the PCF and the rallying of unions 
behind Hollande appeared to signal the possibility of a social democratic bloc in France. 
However, in reality, this is a temporary and unstable phenomenon as few mutual benefits can 
be assured by either unions or the Socialist Party through the creation of more stable union-
party links. The explanations for this are structural, ideational and contingent. 
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Introduction 
 
Historically, particularly in Western Europe, left-wing parties were seen to have close links 
with trade unions in a mutually beneficial exchange wherein unions mobilized voters for parties 
and received access to power, or at least influence over policy, in return. Despite variation in 
the degree and pace of change across countries, some recent studies suggest a weakening of 
links over the past two decades (Thomas, 2001; Upchurch et al, 2009; Hyman and Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2010; Allern and Bale, 2012). 
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 With the notable exception of Daley (1993) very little has been written in the last few 
decades specifically on party-union links in France, but now is a good time to reassess the 
situation as France appears to be bucking wider trends. Indeed, the 2012 presidential election 
suggested movement towards closer party-union links after decades of professed neutrality on 
the part of unions. Francois Hollande’s campaign team recruited members of the CFDT, while 
the campaign itself was influenced by CFDT notions of social democracy. After the election, 
CFDT members took up positions within the new governing administration, and Hollande 
implemented his campaign promise to hold annual ‘Social Conferences’ involving 
representatives of employers, unions and the State. With unions across the board either 
implicitly or explicitly backing Hollande in the elections, the constitution of a social-
democratic force uniting the political and industrial wings of the labour movement finally 
appeared possible. 
 In what follows, we will argue that although some of the structural conditions for close 
party-union relations have improved, they work in contradictory directions. The result is that 
cost-benefit analysis still mitigates against close links, while ideational norms are still powerful 
obstacles that mean that party-union relations will be characterized by ad hoc arrangements for 
the foreseeable future. For these reasons, Hollande’s rapprochement with the unions cannot 
last. Firstly, we will review the literature on party-union relations with the specific aim of 
setting out what these structural conditions are before giving a brief overview of changes in 
union-party relations in France in the post-war period. We will then examine whether the 2012 
elections represent a sea-change in these relations. Elements of continuity and change will then 
be explained before concluding comments are made. 
 Before this, however, a brief methodological note is in order. This article is based upon 
research carried out within the framework of an international project examining party-union 
relations in thirteen countries across the world. The results reported here are based upon an 
examination of secondary literature, press reports, party and union documentation, and on 
questionnaires sent to high-level union representatives in France. The detailed results of the 
questionnaires are reported elsewhere (see Allern and Bale, forthcoming)1. While an attempt is 
made to cover all union organizations, for reasons of space, the main focus will be upon the 
CGT and CFDT as the largest unions with, historically the closest links to left parties 
 
 
Party-union links 
 
Party-union links can take many forms and have been operationalized in many ways (see for 
example Duverger and Wagoner, 1968; Wilson, 1990; Thomas, 2001; Allern and Bale, 2012). 
For the purposes of this article, due to limitations of space, we will not enter into this debate 
but adopt a broad definition of such linkages as encompassing, through the notion of ‘political 
families’ – here defined as the sharing of broad ideological views and values across 
organisations -, a degree of organizational closeness that can be mapped through political 
support of unions for parties and reciprocation in the form of policy enactments by parties that 
are negotiated with, and are in line with, union preferences. 
 Several trends apparent since the 1970s have been used to explain the weakening of 
union-party relationships across these dimensions. Firstly, the catch-all party thesis 
(Kirchheimer, 1966) suggests that as parties attempt to appeal to a greater cross-section of 
society to gain power, they weaken their links with the social movements that had sustained 
them in the past for fear of alienating other social groups. This evolution can be seen as linked 
to the idea that deep class and other –particularly religious – cleavages in society resulted in 
close union-party links as a means of gaining influence and power (Rokkan, 1968). The 
attenuation of such cleavages and ‘ideological blurring’ (Pasture, 1996: 380) suggest that this 
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leads to a weakening of party-union links. The cartel party thesis (Katz and Mair, 2009) 
suggests that as parties are increasingly incorporated into the State, including by public 
financing of their activities, they lose room for manoeuvre in policy terms as they become 
increasingly dependent on the State rather than individuals or interest groups for funding. Such 
external constraints are reinforced by globalization, Europeanization, and latterly, by economic 
crisis all of which reduce margins for manoeuvre in the search for international competitiveness 
(Parsons, 2012). The resultant policy implications mean that links with parties become less 
attractive to unions. 
 From the trade union side, the decline of the blue-collar working class, the tertiarization 
of the economy and the rise of the middle class have led to both ideological shifts away from 
social democracy and to a loss of members among unions. Again, these trends are seen as 
weakening party-union links, not only because unions can offer parties less, but also because 
unions attempt to recruit new members with different identities and interests from those of their 
traditional base (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010: 321). 
 As well as these more recent trends, the political system has been seen as affecting party 
union relations. As far as France is concerned, these can be briefly summarized as follows. The 
predominance of a technocratic approach to decision-making overseen by a strong, self-assured 
bureaucracy produced in the system of elite grandes écoles was reinforced by the semi-
presidential system put in place after 1962. The presence of a strong executive, supported by 
cohesive parties in a weak parliament, resulted in a relative isolation of ministers from interest 
group activities. This feeds off of a deep-rooted Jacobin political culture that sees the State as 
the guardian of the general will (Parsons, 2013). Consultation with unions and hence, strong 
party-union links, were thus never considered important by governing elites. This is all the 
more so as organizational fragmentation and competition, particularly amongst unions, 
precluded any close and long-lasting relationships (Howell, 1992: 48). 
 Within the above constraints, party-union links have often been conceptualized in terms 
of a cost-benefit exchange (see, for example, Allern et al, 2007). Thus, for parties, close links 
with unions give access to electoral support as members may be mobilized to vote for the party, 
as well as to, in some cases, provide financial support and help during election campaigns. For 
unions, the benefits may involve increased membership if the party encourages this, and, 
particularly, influence over the party’s policies. On the cost side, parties need to take into 
account the possibility of alienating other groups of voters or possible coalition partners if it is 
seen as the union’s party, and the potential for making policy promises that may conflict with 
other priorities. For unions, the main risk lies in alienating current and potential members, and 
in the loss of the freedom to seek arrangements with other parties who may offer a better deal. 
Changes in cost-benefit calculations will therefore affect party-union relations. 
 Finally, in the French case, one other consideration appears crucial. Taylor et al (2011) 
argue that national patterns of party-union relations are path dependent and influenced by 
ideology and framing. Thus, normative factors may temper rational cost-benefit analysis and 
are rooted in historical legacies. We therefore now turn to a brief historical overview of party-
union relations in France. 
 
 
Parties and unions in France: a fragmented landscape 
 
Historically, the general picture of left parties and unions in France is one of fragmentation, 
particularly on the trade union side. Two major left-wing parties have existed since a split in 
the French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO) – created in 1905 from the 
amalgamation of several left organizations – led to the establishment of the French Communist 
Party (PCF) in 1920. These two formations struggled for supremacy on the left with the SFIO, 
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after changing its name to the Socialist Party (PS) in 1969, finally supplanting the PCF as the 
dominant party of the left from the mid- to late-1970s under the leadership of François 
Mitterrand, and becoming a ‘catch-all’ party by the 1981 elections (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 
200-201). Since World War Two, the PCF vote in parliamentary elections declined from 28% 
in 1946 to 21% in 1978 to 4.3% in 2007 before the Party allied with the Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s 
Left Party to score 7% in the 2012 legislative elections. Over the same period, the socialists 
increased their score from 18% in 1946 to 23% in 1978 and 48.5% in 2012 (france-politique 
no date, a, b).  
On the trade union side things are more complicated. Historically, unions in France 
generally recruit members across all sectors of the economy, with members joining out of 
ideological affiliation rather than occupational category. The oldest major union, the General 
Confederation of Labour (CGT) was founded in 1895, although divisions soon surfaced. 
Early divisions centred on religion, with the French Confederation of Christian Workers 
(CFTC) being established in 1919 as a moderate Catholic alternative to the radical CGT. The 
next major development occurred in 1948, when Force ouvrière (FO) was established 
following a split within the CGT in reaction to the increasing influence of the PCF over the 
confederation, which was cemented in the World War Two resistance movement. In addition, 
the Democratic French Confederation of Labour (CFDT) was created in 1964 when the 
majority of the CFTC decided to deconfessionalize and pursue a ‘third way’ between the 
reformist FO and CFTC on the one hand, and the bureaucratic state socialism of the CGT-PCF 
tandem on the other.  
Although the CGT emerged from World War Two as the largest French union 
confederation, it has been in constant decline from the 1970s, a trend that has also affected the 
PCF. In 1946, the CGT claimed nearly six million members, a number that had fallen to just 
under two million by the end of the 1970s and now stands at nearly 700,000 (Bevort 1995: 45; 
Dayan 2012). To combat this trend, the CGT has, since the 1980s, attempted to distance itself 
from the declining PCF moving – albeit hesitatingly - towards the social-democratic middle 
ground. This opened up space on the left for the so-called ‘autonomous’ unions, unattached to 
any confederation, to grow. Thus, autonomous Solidaires, unitaires, démocratiques (SUD) 
movements developed in many public sector organizations from 1989 onwards as members 
defected from established confederations. The SUD unions joined, and radicalized, the ‘Group 
of 10’ unions unaffiliated to any confederation, which was created in 1981 and became the 
Union syndicale solidaire (USS) in 1998. Furthermore, the far left Fédération des syndicats 
unifiée (FSU) and the social-democratic Union nationale des syndicats autonomes (UNSA) 
grew out of a split in the National Education Federation (FEN), a teachers’ union in 1992. 
Union weakness can be seen in the fact that less than 8% of wage earners are unionized in 
France– the lowest of any OECD country –, as compared to 30% in 1949 and 20% in the mid-
1970s (Parsons, 2013: 190-91). French unions have lost two-thirds of their members since the 
1970s (Andolfatto, 2007: 233).  
 
 
Party-union relations: the myth of independence 
 
Party-union relations (or lack of them), however, are not merely the result of historical 
divisions within the industrial arm of the French labour movement, but can also be ascribed to 
a divided political Left at the time of the formation of French unions. While not precluding a 
close relationship between union and party on the communist left in the post-war period, these 
historical considerations have left a marked legacy on party-union relations in France. 
At its creation in 1895, the CGT was marked by anarcho-syndicalist ideas and, in a 
context of political fragmentation on the left, opted for independence from political parties. 
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This orientation was enshrined in the Charter of Amiens of 1906, which has become the iconic 
text of the French trade union movement, and one to which all unions in France still make 
implicit or explicit reference.  
For parties, while the independence of the trade union movement is respected, things 
are more nuanced. According to the Chapter 1.6 of the Statues of the PCF (2013): 
(…) communists create and participate in the creation of all forms of 
appropriate partnerships with all progressive organizations: political 
organizations, unions, groups, interested citizens, while respecting the identity, 
specific aims and independence of each.2  
For the PS (2012), ‘Members of the Party are encouraged to belong to a trade 
union’ or other interest group (Statutes, Art. 2.1.1.2.3), and indeed have a ‘duty’ to do 
so according to the Party’s Ethics Charter (PS no date). 
Thus, while unions clearly assert their desire for complete independence, party 
statues suggest that relations are far more nuanced than a clear-cut division of labour 
between the industrial and political wings of the labour movement would suggest. 
Indeed, the history of union-party relations in France clearly demonstrates that the idea 
of complete independence for the trade union movement has been a myth, at least since 
the creation of the PCF in 1920. At this point in time the CGT split into revolutionary 
and reformist factions. While, following the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, revolutionaries 
accepted the Leninist conception of the subordination of trade union action to a 
revolutionary party in order to capture control of the State, the reformists sought 
accommodation with the State (Charles et al, 1995: 44-8; Robert, 1995).  
After World War Two, the main cleavage on the left in France was between the 
communists with tight links between the CGT and PCF on the one hand, and the no-
communist left with FO, then the CFDT, forming (less tight) bonds with the Socialist 
Party. On the communist side of the divide, during the period from the end of World 
War Two to the mid-1990s, although there were no formal links between the two 
organizations, it was customary for the General Secretary of the CGT to be a member 
of the Political Bureau of the PCF. Indeed, ‘the party used its leadership positions 
within the union to make labour market actions complement programmatic positions’ 
(Daley, 1993: 57). In general terms, although the CGT gained some ‘relative autonomy’ 
from the 1960s to the mid-1970s, the CGT acted as a ‘transmission belt’ for the PCF 
within a wider ’communist ecosystem’ comprising clubs, societies, pressure groups and 
municipalities as well as the union and party (Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004: 17-18; 
Pernot, 2013: 198-9, 204-5). However, CGT support for the PCF was not always 
unconditional. Although the CGT aligned itself with the PCF’s ‘pauperization’ thesis, 
claiming the decline in the living standards of the working classes in a period of 
economic boom, in 1955, the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 was not supported 
by the CGT leadership, despite the approval of the PCF (Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004: 
28-29). Nevertheless, in the 1980s, the CGT was an enthusiastic supporter of François 
Mitterrand’s Socialist-Communist coalition government of 1981-4, only offering 
‘muted’ criticism of austerity policies while attempting to distance itself from them. 
Once the PCF withdrew from government in 1984, however, the CGT ‘was only too 
happy to return to an adversarial stance’ (Howell, 1992: 164). 
Among the non-communist trade unions, relations were looser being ‘more 
characterized by personal affinities than by organizational linkages’ (Daley, 1993: 57). 
Thus, although FO was a heterogeneous grouping held together by anti-communism 
and therefore espoused a minimalist ideology of incremental gains through collective 
bargaining, it had good relations with the SFIO and then its successor, the PS. In the 
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1960s, the other main left-wing non-communist union, the CFDT, formed, with the 
Unified Socialist Party (PSU), part of the ‘second left’, rejecting the Soviet-influenced 
bureaucratic centralism of the CGT-PCF tandem and the welfare reformism inherent in 
FO’s approach to political and social change. In 1974, however, the PSU merged with 
the PS and many CFDT members and leaders, wishing to build up a unified non-
communist left, followed, despite strong criticism from the left of the confederation 
(ibid., 1993: 57). Following the failure of the Common Programme of Government and 
the Left’s failure to win the 1978 parliamentary elections, the CFDT embarked on a 
process of ‘resyndicalization’ – or focussing on trade union action, notably through 
collective bargaining, rather than seeking national level political and social 
transformation. Although this resulted in more difficult relations with the political left, 
there was an ‘alignment of the CFDT on socialist positions in the quarrel between the 
PS, the PCF and the CGT’ (Labbé and Croisat, 1992: 140-1) and the CFDT called for 
a vote in favour of the socialist François Mitterrand in the 1981 presidential elections. 
Following the latter’s victory, high-ranking CFDT (and CGT) members were recruited 
as advisors in ministerial cabinets, although this was in a personal rather than 
organizational capacity (Kergoat, 1984; Labbé and Croisat, 1992: 140-1). By the 1980s, 
CFDT influence on PS policy could be clearly seen in the field of industrial relations, 
with the passing of the Auroux Laws in 1982 (Labbé and Croisat, 1992: 140-1). Even 
austerity policies from 1982 onwards received broad, if not at times unqualified, CFDT 
support (Howell, 1992: 161-4; Pernot, 2013: 213). 
 
 
The weakening of Party-Union links from the 1980s 
 
Relations between the CGT and PCF were becoming problematic from the late 1970s 
onwards. In 1977, the CGT criticised the attitude of the PCF when renegotiation of the 
Common Programme of Government with the PS failed and ended in acrimony, 
resulting in the Left’s failure to win the 1978 parliamentary elections when it had 
seemed on the verge of power for the first time since the creation of the Fifth Republic. 
The CGT Congress that year saw Georges Séguy criticise his own communist-
dominated leadership as it did not ‘always correctly reflect the diversity of the CGT’ 
and for its ‘intolerance towards different ideas’ (cited in Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004: 
34). His call for greater diversity and openness, however, was rejected by other leaders 
and the organization returned to its orthodox communist beliefs under Henri Krasucki 
in 1982. As PCF electoral fortunes and CGT membership both declined throughout the 
1980s, however, critical voices from with the CGT demanded ‘modernization’, and 
with it, greater autonomy from the PCF. The result was that whereas previous post war 
elections were always marked by CGT calls for a vote for the PCF, from 1988 onwards 
the CGT has not given any guidance to members on how to vote in either parliamentary 
or presidential elections. 
At the 29th Congress of the CGT in 1995, Louis Viannet, the then General 
Secretary announced that he no longer needed to be an ‘organic liaison’ between the 
Party and trade union, and that he was resigning from the PCF National Bureau (now 
Executive Committee), signifying the end of the ‘transmission belt’ between the party 
and the masses, despite the fact that several other PCF members remained as leaders of 
the CGT, and despite the fact that he kept his seat on the National Committee, the 
‘parliament’, of the PCF (Courtois and Andolfatto, 2008). Since then, neither of his 
successors, Bernard Thibault (1999-2013) and the current incumbent, Thierry Lepaon, 
have been members of the National Bureau/Executive Committee. Thibault was a 
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member of the National Council but resigned his seat in 2001, arguing that the 
confederation needs greater ‘autonomy of thought and decision-making’ (cited in 
Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004: 39). This left the CGT without any representation on the 
central governing bodies of the PCF (Courtois and Andolfatto, 2008). In 2013, when 
the Executive Commission of the CGT and National Council of the PCF were re-
elected, only one person, Pascal Joly, sat on both. He was, however, not on the more 
restricted governing body –respectively the Confederal Bureau and the Executive 
Committee – of either.  This distancing has not been without problems, however, and 
has led to tensions between ‘modernizers’ and the ‘orthodox’ line. Notably, in 2005 
Thibault was outnumbered when arguing for neutrality in the referendum on the EU 
Constitutional Treaty by those, faithful to the PCF line, favouring opposition (ibid.). 
Although the CFDT had supported Mitterrand’s election and some leading 
members had worked for the PS government, relations soon soured in a context of 
persistently high unemployment, unpopular austerity policies and a rapidly declining 
membership base. The CFDT, for the first time since 1970, did not call for a vote for 
the Left in the 1986 parliamentary elections. This distancing from the political left 
continued with no call to vote for Mitterrand in the 1988 presidential elections. By this 
stage the process of ‘resyndicalization’ was complete as the emphasis on what was 
‘negotiable in the here and now’ resulted in ‘a certain negation of the role of politics’ 
(Pernot, 2013: 214). Nevertheless, certain individuals maintained close ties with the 
government: following Mitterrand’s second presidential election victory in 1988, 
Jacques Chérèque, the CFDT Deputy General Secretary and later General Secretary, 
became Minister for Regional Development and Industrial Reconversion in Michel 
Rocard’s centre-left government, and Hubert Prévot, a national secretary, oversaw the 
break-up of the publicly-owned post and telecommunications company, the PTT 
(Landré, 2013). However, the new reformist orientation of the confederation was 
confirmed in spectacular fashion in 1995 when the CFDT supported the broad thrust of 
the Gaullist Prime Minister Alain Juppé’s social security reforms despite the opposition 
of all other unions and the largest strike wave, in November and December of that year, 
seen in France since May 1968. Since then, the CFDT has persisted in its reformist-
syndicalist logic, proving itself to be the confederation most likely to sign deals with 
employers (Pernot, 2010: 212-16). 
Finally, while the CGT appeared to be moving, hesitatingly, towards a centre-
left position in an attempt to distance itself from a declining communist party, for 
example in joining the social-democratic ETUC in 1999 (Parsons 2005: 56), FO moved 
in the other direction, becoming more radical when Marc Blondel succeeded André 
Bergeron in 1989 with the support of members also affiliated to the Trotskyist Workers’ 
Party. As they increased their influence within the confederation, relations with the PS 
became increasingly tense (Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004: 37). 
Trade union desires for autonomy from political parties were reflected in the 
pronouncements of parties in the 1990s. Hence, reflecting the deep-rooted Jacobin 
political culture that is suspicious of the role of intermediary bodies between the 
government and the people, the then First Secretary and later Prime Minister, Lionel 
Jospin, argued, at the PS Congress of 1994, that trade unions were valuable 
interlocutors of government, but that their role should be limited to consultation and 
negotiation on labour market issues. Policy making and implementation was ‘the 
responsibility of the political powers in the economic sphere, and hence their obligation 
to determine priorities, objectives and the means of obtaining results’ (cited in Parsons, 
2002: 119). Likewise the PCF called for the increased influence of tripartite bodies in 
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policy making ‘to help those elected to office to take decisions’ (cited in Parsons, 2002: 
119, my emphasis).  
 
The 2012 presidential elections - a turning point? 
During elections since the 1980s, trade unions maintained the strict ‘neutrality’ that the 
CGT and CFDT opted for in 1986 and 1988 respectively, with none calling for voters 
to vote for any particular party or candidate. In 2012, however, in the wake of years of 
austerity policies and social reform following the 2008 financial and economic crisis, 
there was evidence of unions attempting to influence elections again. Thus the CGT, 
FSU and USS called on voters to ‘beat Sarkozy’, while the CFDT, although declaring 
itself neutral, was highly critical of the outgoing president (Andolfatto, 2012). Days 
before the first round of the elections, Bernard Thibault was more explicit: on 1 May 
2012, when interviewed on Europe 1, he declared that he and the CGT supported the 
PS candidate, François Hollande, ‘on the basis on trade union demands’ (Europe 1 
2012).   
Despite officially respecting its neutrality in the 2012 presidential election, the 
CFDT too is renewing ties to the party. Indeed, CFDT thinking seems to have been 
influential in François Hollande’s election campaign. From June 2011, Hollande was 
setting out his vision of social democracy (Hollande 2011) – a vision directly inspired 
by the CFDT -, while Jacky Bontems, the former Deputy General Secretary of the 
CFDT was recruited to his campaign team along with members of UNSA (Laurent, 
2012). Reciprocally, the PS, and François Hollande in particular, have been making 
overtures to the unions. In September 2011, during his PS ‘primaries’ campaign, he met 
with 240 trade unionist from across the board with the exception of the USS. In line 
with his promise of a renewal of social democracy and in exchange for the mobilization 
of trade unionists’ votes, Hollande promised the unions greater influence in the 
elaboration of social policies (Lhaïk, 2011). Following Hollande’s victory, François 
Chérèque, the General Secretary of the CFDT until November 2012, was named 
Inspector for Social Affairs in early January 2013, where his first task would be to 
oversee an anti-poverty plan that he himself had proposed to the new government at a 
social summit a few months earlier. In addition, Bontems was recruited to the 
government’s strategic planning office, the Commissariat général à la stratégie et à la 
prospective, while the former national secretary for relations with political parties, 
Laurence Laigo was recruited to the ministerial cabinet of Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the 
Minister for Women’s Rights until November 2013 (Landré, 2013; Mariaucourt, 2013). 
Finally, in what was seen as a cynical move to try to reconnect with working-class 
voters being lost to the FN, the CFDT General Secretary of the Steelworkers Federation 
in the North-Lorraine region, Edouard Martin, was designated to lead the PS list for the 
East France constituency in the 2014 European elections, less than a year after 
criticising the government for not doing enough to prevent the closure of Arcelor-Mittal 
steelworks in the Lorraine (Bourmaud, 2013). 
Thus, the 2012 election appeared to suggest that unions were coming out of 
their hyper-neutral stances of the previous twenty years and positioning themselves on 
the left, with the PS being seen as the privileged political partner. Subsequent events, 
however, have shown this rapprochement to be very fragile. 
Even though Holland promised to ‘make the bankers pay’ for economic crisis with the 
tacit backing of the unions, his governments have implemented austerity measures in order to 
attempt to reduce state deficits and debts. Nevertheless, to reconcile the need for debt reduction 
with economic and employment growth, in his end-of-year speech to the nation in 2013 
17 
 
Hollande proposed a ‘Responsibility and Solidarity Pact’ between employers and unions, 
involving reduced taxes and social charges to total €50m for companies in exchange for job 
creation, training and investment, with employer commitments on these to be the subject of the 
Pact. In the end only the CFDT, and the right-leaning CFTC, as well as the managerial union 
CGC-CFE, signed the Pact with employer organizations (vie-publique, 2014). 
This suggests that, with the possible exception of the CFDT, links are weak and that 
unions have little impact upon government policy, a notion confirmed in the July 2014 ‘Social 
Conference’, an annual event instituted by Hollande as a forum for tripartite social dialogue. 
In 2014, the CGT, FO, USS and FSU all walked out of the conference, criticising the 
government for a lack of true dialogue, and for the general orientation of its policies. Only the 
CFDT, UNSA and CFTC, again with the CGC-CFE, remained willing to remain in discussion 
with the socialist government (Roussel, 2014). 
Thus, the trade union movement appears to be divided between what could loosely be 
termed a social democratic bloc and ‘contestataires’ holding to a more radical line. As noted 
above, the other major change in party-union relations – the gradual dissolution of the PCF-
CGT dyad – appeared to be confirmed in the 2012 presidential elections as the CGT backed 
Hollande rather than the PCF backed Front de gauche candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon. 
Explanations for these evolutions and to what extent they represent a durable new configuration 
of party-union relations in France will now be discussed. 
 
Evaluating change 
The closest and most stable union-party relationship in France developed after World 
War Two between the CGT and PCF. On the non-communist left, close relationships 
also developed between the PS on the one hand and FO and the CFDT on the other. In 
both cases, however, although ‘political families’ may still be discernible, the links 
between unions hand parties have become weaker since the 1980s, as can be seen from 
voting behaviour. 
While data on the voting behaviour of trade union members is not available, 
opinion polls regularly measure voting behaviour according to trade union ‘sympathy’ 
or ‘proximity’, and this can be used as a proxy for the extent to which unions can deliver 
votes to parties and, conversely, the extent to which parties can deliver members to 
unions. 
Table 2. Voting behaviour according to trade union support. First round of Presidential elections, % 
 Ext 
Left 
PCF/FG PS Centre Gaullist National 
Front 
Other 
CGT        
 -2002 20 18 24 6 9 12 11 
-2007 12 7 42 11 11 12 5 
-2012 2 39 44 2 1 9 3 
CFDT        
-2002 7 1 26 18 19 10 19 
-2007 3 1 39 24 20 8 5 
-2012 2 6 56 4 15 12 5 
FO        
-2002 20 3 18 12 15 15 17 
-2007 15 3 25 19 20 14 4 
-2012 8 13 28 5 15 25 6 
CFTC        
-2002 4 1 3 15 39 19 19 
-2007 6 1 7 24 39 8 15 
-2012 1 4 20 15 42 15 3 
UNSA        
-2002 n.d. n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d 
-2007 0 4 29 29 23 0 15 
-2012 0 14 49 5 10 16 6 
FSU        
-2002 n.d. n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d 
-2007 9 3 69 14 1 0 4 
-2012 0 31 61 3 1 3 1 
USS 
(SUD) 
       
-2002 39 1 25 4 4 3 24 
-2007 22 0 42 27 2 1 6 
-2012 9 39 35 5 0 4 8 
Sources:  2002, 2007: CSA; 2012 clesdusocial.com 
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Until the 1980s, it was possible to speak of loose ties based on ideological 
affinity (Daley, 1993). Thus, the majority of CGT members would follow the union’s 
call to support the party at election time. Likewise the majority of CFDT members 
would vote for the PS, resulting in one communist and one non-communist bloc on the 
Left of French politics. However, in recent years these ideological links appear to have 
weakened. Even though the CGT stopped issuing any voting guidance to its members 
in the 1988 presidential election, over half of the members of the confederation voted 
communist in the next national elections, the 1993 legislatives. By the 1997 legislative 
elections, however, this figure had fallen to 39%, while more of those close to the CGT 
voted for the socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin, than voted for the communist candidate 
Robert Hue – 39% to 35% - in the 1995 presidential election (Andolfatto, 2001: 75-
77).  This trend has continued into the 2000s, with the PS candidate gaining more votes 
from CGT sympathisers than the PCF candidate in the presidential elections of 2002, 
2007 and 2012 (Table 1). The latter election did see a drift back towards the PCF-
backed candidate, but this was not a communist. Indeed, after a disastrous showing in 
the 2007 elections when the PCF candidate, Marie-Georges Buffet scored less than 2% 
in the first round (with only 7% of CGT sympathisers voting for her as opposed to 42% 
who voted for the PS candidate, Ségolène Royal), the PCF did not put up its own 
candidate, but allied itself with Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s Left Party to form the Left Front 
with Mélenchon as the presidential candidate. 
As we have seen, the CFDT has been close to the PS since the 1970s. In the 
1993 legislative elections, just over 40% of those professing to be close to the CFDT 
voted PS, with 45% giving their support to Lionel Jospin, the PS candidate in the 1995 
presidential elections (Andolfatto, 2001: 75-77). Support, however, has fluctuated in 
the twenty-first century, falling to 26% in the 2002 presidential elections before rising 
again to 56% in 2012 (Table 1). Although the PS gets the lion’s share of the votes from 
CFDT sympathisers, the vote is split. One in five CFDT sympathisers regularly votes 
for the Gaullist candidate in presidential and legislative elections, a figure that rose to 
one in three in 1997 (Andolfatto, 2001: 76), and to 44% in the 2007 presidential 
elections. Even in 2012, when CFDT supporters returned to the socialist fold, 15% still 
voted for the Gaullist candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, and 12% for the National Front’s 
Marine Le Pen (Table 1).  
FO, traditionally close to the left of the PS, shows a similar trajectory: a move 
away from support for extreme left parties and increasing support for the socialists. The 
latter trend is not as pronounced as for the CFDT or CGT, and the voting behaviour of 
FO supporters is the most diverse of any of the unions considered here. Indeed, while 
the PS again gets the highest share of the votes at 28%, the centre, Gaullists and the FN 
also score well, with the latter getting one in four votes from FO sympathisers in 2012 
(Table 1). 
Among other trade unions, similar trends can be seen. Most unionists’ votes go 
to the PS, with the exception of the USS, whose members seem to have progressively 
abandoned the extreme left, initially to the benefit of the socialists, then to the benefit 
of the Left Front in 2012. FSU and USS votes are far more concentrated on the left of 
the political divide than those of other unions, with the FSU, in particular, showing 
strong support for the PS. 
Thus, while the PS still benefits from the highest levels of electoral support from 
trade unionists in France (with the exception of the right-leaning CFTC), the seemingly-
stable ‘political families’ of the 1970s are disintegrating. The PCF/CGT dyad has all 
but disappeared, with CGT voters only returning to the fold once the PCF has lost its 
prominent position as the main left alternative to the PS. Even then, PS supporters 
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outnumbered PCF/FG supporters among CGT sympathisers in 2012. Along with the 
CGT, USS votes are split between the FG/extreme left and the PS. The main unions 
historically close to the PS – the CFDT and FO – have seen large percentages and at 
times the majority of their sympathisers abandon the left altogether for centrist, Gaullist 
and even National Front candidates in presidential elections in the twenty-first century. 
Nevertheless, CFDT, UNSA and FSU sympathisers tend to support the PS. However, 
while the PS is the main electoral beneficiary of trade unionists’ votes, this support is 
volatile and fragmented with only sympathisers of the FSU voting in their majority for 
the PS candidate in more than one of the three presidential elections of the twenty-first 
century (Table 1). 
From the party side, trade union weakness and fragmentation in France has long 
weakened the attractiveness of stable party-union relations. Indeed, the traditional 
independence of unions and their appeal to workers irrespective of their partisan 
allegiance means that they cannot deliver voters en bloc to any one party at election 
time, a problem that has continued into this century. Thus, in terms of cost-benefit 
exchange, with the exception of the FSU, unions cannot consistently deliver voters to 
the PS. Once in power, the PS has little to lose, therefore, in alienating some of its trade 
union constituency by pursuing policies it perceives as necessary and achievable within 
the wider constraints imposed by global financial markets and economic crisis.  
The fact that union sympathisers have coalesced behind the PS in recent 
elections should not therefore be seen as a sign of closer ties or union influence, but of 
the fact that since the late 1970s, the PS has emerged as the only credible left party of 
government. Put simply, if they wish to have any influence on government policy, 
unions, their members and sympathisers have nowhere else to go. However, if a left 
party captures power, it lacks a credible and dependable union interlocutor due to the 
political heterogeneity of the union base. While close relations are at times possible, 
these tend to be unstable as the experience of the 1981-84 socialist government’s 
relations with the CFDT show.  
For parties in government, this is not a major problem. Historically, the State 
has been seen, and has portrayed itself, as the guarantor of the general interest. As we 
have argued elsewhere (Parsons, 2002), there are deep historical roots to this, producing 
a powerful discourse about the role of the state in France that has resulted in a certain 
suspicion of organized interests, and a consequent centralization of decision-making 
power. Under the Fifth Republic, established in 1958, de Gaulle rejected any claims of 
interest groups to determine policy, claiming that even the most representative lacked 
authority and political responsibility, as opposed to the state which, alone, could 
incarnate and serve the national interest. On the other hand, he accepted that they should 
be consulted over policy. However, the general picture was one of highly centralized, 
state-dominated policy-making (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 321; Hazareesingh 1994, 
151 - 152). From the 1980s, the Jacobin state may have come under pressure, externally 
from globalization and Europeanization and internally from state policies of 
decentralization, deregulation and privatization, but unions have not been able to 
capitalize on this as these same developments have weakened them (Parsons, 2005; 
2013). 
From the union side, the political heterogeneity of membership means that they 
have little incentive to continue to support a government that can not, or will not, deliver 
their preferred policies. This is all the more the case as such rational calculations must 
be made within the constraints of an ideational heritage that looks unfavourably upon 
close union-party links. 
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Structurally, the multi-party system in France means that political division risks 
being internalized by unions. Although the main unions had a political project, defined 
in terms of the emancipation of the working class, partisan political allegiance was 
rejected for this reason in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While this 
model did not reflect the reality of relations in the post-war period, there has, to some 
extent at least, been a return to it since the 1980s. The main manifestation of this is the 
weakening of the link between the PCF and the CGT, and this can largely be explained 
by the electoral decline of the communists following participation in the first Mitterrand 
government and the collapse of the USSR (Pernot 2013: 194). While one in five voters 
voted for PCF candidates in presidential and parliamentary elections in the 1960s and 
1970s, this had halved by the mid-1980s and halved again during the 2000s with the 
PCF regularly scoring under 5%, and the PCF candidate, Marie-George Buffet only 
gaining 1.9% of the votes in the first round of the 2007 presidential elections (france-
politique, no date, c). While the CGT’s search for greater autonomy from the PCF 
reflects the battle between orthodox and modernising currents within both 
organizations, strategic cost-benefit considerations related to the decline of the PCF are 
also important, with the CGT having a strategic incentive to broaden its appeal beyond 
its traditional communist base and to avoid the reputational damage of being closely 
allied to a declining and increasingly discredited political force. Other unions find 
themselves in a similar, although not so severe, situation, with a need to take the 
political heterogeneity of their members and potential members into account when 
assessing the benefits of relations with unions. 
Thus, contradictory trends seem to be at work. On the one hand the emergence 
of the PS as the only credible Left party of government may give unions greater 
incentives to support the party in the hope of gaining political influence, giving rise to 
the possibility of a more institutionally linked social democratic bloc. Such a possibility 
is increased by the break-up of the PCF/CGT dyad and the rallying of the majority of 
the latter’s sympathisers to the PS. On the other hand, other structural variables – the 
fragmentation of the union movement, the catch-all nature of the PS, the continued 
relative centralization of decision-making power and the constraints of globalization 
and Europeanization – as well as political contingencies associated with policy-making 
during a time of crisis, all mitigate against close party-union relations. Thus, alongside 
austerity packages, Hollande’s presiding over an increased flexibility of the labour 
market through the ‘flexicurity’ agreement may have been a ‘considerable 
achievement’, but it was also upsetting to the trade union movement (Clift 2014: 10; 
Clift and Ryner 2014). Given these major constraints, the rallying of support to 
Hollande in 2012 was ever only likely to be temporary.  
Indeed, in many respects the changes associated with the 2012 presidential 
elections were politically contingent, dependent upon the impact of right dominated 
governments since 2002, which engaged in sometimes radical social reform against the 
wishes of the unions – in particular the raising of the pension age from 60 to 62 in 2010. 
To this could be added the effects of crisis management by these right-wing 
governments, with announcements of spending cuts and rising taxes to deal with 
government debt in a context of high and rising unemployment. In this respect, the 
CFDT’s stance could be explained, not by a desire to renew and reinforce ties with PS, 
but by the restricted space for collective bargaining on issues such as pension reform 
under the previous administration (Pernot, 2013: 213-4). For other unions too, any 
attempt to gain political influence could only mean support for the PS since the other 
major party of the Left, the PCF, had gone into sharp decline. As Didier Le Reste, the 
General Secretary of the CGT Railway Federation, put it, ‘I think that we went too far 
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towards a position of independence and political neutrality. That led to a certain 
depoliticization, which contributed to weakening the balance of power’ (Deslandes, 
2011). Unions therefore want to see the left returned to power in the hope of gaining 
support for trade union campaigns and struggles.  
However, with the exception of Thibault, union leaders hesitated to come out 
in favour of any particular party. In the case of the CGT this can be explained by its 
desire to clearly demarcate itself from the CGT and to appeal to a wider social base. 
For other unions, in the context of multi-party electoral competition engendered by the 
French two-ballot system, it is better to say who you are against rather than to specify 
who you are for. This is not only because unions’ membership bases have become more 
politically heterogeneous, so a declaration in favour of any particular candidate or party 
runs the risk of alienating significant proportions of the current and potential members. 
It is also a function of the ideational heritage of the early trade union movement in 
France. 
Indeed, any transgression of the demarcation between what is considered union 
activity and the role of parties comes up against a strong element of French political 
culture. As has been demonstrated above, trade union independence from political 
parties was a myth, but it was, and still is, a powerful one. Opinion polls regularly show 
that, while French unions have a generally positive image among French workers, the 
main criticism of them is that they are too politicized (Labbé and Croisat, 1992: 129 - 
131; Parsons, 2013). In 2013, a TNS-Sofres poll found that the level of confidence in 
unions among wage-earners to defend their interests had remained stable since 2010 at 
55%. However, there was also a degree of stability in the proportion criticising unions 
for being ‘too ideological’ (76% in 2013) and ‘too politicized’ (69% in 2013) (TNS-
Sofres 2013). In Labbé and Croisat’s 1992 study of the CFDT, even those sympathetic 
to or members of a political party, rejected party-union links. Indeed, in the study this 
was a motivating factor for 40% of those who had left the CFDT (Labbé and Croisat, 
1992: 129 – 152). Maintaining, in public, at least, a distance from political parties 
therefore serves union interests in a situation where membership is already extremely 
low, inter-union rivalry fierce and the free rider problem acute due to the nature of the 
French industrial relations system. In effect, extension procedures for collective 
agreements and the applicability of union gains to non-members reduce individual 
incentives to join (Parsons, 2005). The attempt to recruit across as broad a base as 
possible, therefore, gives an incentive to relations with parties being kept on a largely 
informal and ad hoc basis. 
It can be seen that party-union links in France have been historically shaped by 
the notion of union independence enshrined in the 1906 Charter of Amiens. While 
complete union independence may have been a historical myth, the lack of organic links 
means that unions do not donate to parties, either to sponsor election campaigns or 
MPs, or via a collective affiliation of members, again weakening incentives for close 
relations on a cost-benefit calculation.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Change and continuity in party-union relationships in France can be analysed from a 
cost-benefit perspective. Unions see few benefits from party affiliation and closeness 
for several reasons: the multi-party nature of the system and the political heterogeneity 
of their own current and potential memberships; the inability of the only credible 
broadly left-wing party to deliver policies in line with their own preferences due to the 
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constraints of electoral competition, crisis, Europeanization and globalization which 
limit the party’s margin for manoeuvre when in government. Likewise, for parties there 
is little incentive for highly institutionalized relationships with fragmented, weak 
unions which cannot consistently deliver voters en masse, particularly as, when in 
power, they are relatively easily bypassed when it comes to policy delivery. The 
essence of these structural considerations has not changed in over one hundred years. 
The main change in party-union relations in France since the 1980s has been 
the weakening of the link between the CGT and PCF so that one can no longer see the 
union as the ‘transmission belt’ of the party. The principle explanation for this lies in 
the decline of the PCF, which has seen the erosion of both its ideological and 
sociological bases. For its own survival in a situation of generalized trade union decline 
and inter-union rivalry, the CGT has had to try to diversify its membership base by 
appealing to workers more broadly. The CGT’s move away from its former communist 
base has opened up the possibility of a social-democratic bloc in France based around 
the PS and a constellation of unions. 
Beyond the communist left, much of the continuity in party-union relations can 
be explained structurally by inter-union rivalry and weakness and party competition, 
and contemporaneously by the experience of the left in government. However, they are 
also historically and conditioned by powerful normative discourses that see a separation 
between unions and parties as desirable. These discourses emanate not only from 
unions through their continued adherence, at least in public, to the principles of the 
Charter of Amiens, but also through political parties and State institutions through the 
notion of governing in the general interest. Thus, while the emergence of the PS as the 
only left alternative for government may improve the structural conditions for a 
reinforcement of ties on the party side of the equation, continued union fragmentation 
and rivalry, along with public antipathy to ‘politicized’ unions, mean that this is 
unlikely to happen, with party-union relations remaining structured around ever looser 
and unstable notions of ‘political families’. 
While the above may explain the fragility of union support for Hollande in 
general, it does not explain why the CFDT continues to support the government, or at 
least has not gone to a position of outright opposition as other unions have, in the face 
of austerity policies. Structural variables and a cost-benefit calculation cannot in 
themselves explain this position. Indeed, the risk for the CFDT is to be seen as the 
government’s union and to alienate members and potential members as austerity 
continues to bite. An explanation must therefore be sought in the ideational realm as 
well as in cost-benefit analysis. Effectively the CFDT is sticking to a path traced since 
the mid-1970s when it embarked upon the process of recentrage and resyndicalisation. 
Its strategy of delivering concrete gains through collective bargaining has seen the 
confederation grow since the 1980s. The calculation is that signing deals such as the 
Responsibility Pact will continue to yield concrete results and reinforce the 
confederation’s image of ‘responsible’ unionism, thereby attracting new members. 
This invites two observations. Firstly, the CFDT’s position is not so much one 
of being closely tied to the PS, but one of negotiation with the State as policy-maker 
and with employers as bargaining partners. Second, as the structural and ideational 
incentives for links with parties are not strong, but with a need for dialogue with 
government for policy influence, support for the Hollande administration can be 
expected to weaken over time, with a return to neutrality in the 2017 elections a distinct 
possibility. Thus, the rallying of unions, even in the case of the CFDT, to Hollande for 
the 2012 presidential elections does not represent a sea-change in party-union relations 
in France. Rather the rapprochement of unions to the PS is politically contingent, and 
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with underlying structural and ideational variables mitigating against party-union ties, 
it is ultimately fragile and in all probability, temporary. 
 
Notes 
1. Generally, the results from the questionnaires showed that the major change in party-union 
relations in France is the disintegration of the PCF/CGT link since the 1980s. Party-union 
relations in France are multi-directional, with no exclusivity in any relationship, on either 
the union or the party side. As a result, they are ad hoc are fairly weak, giving unions little 
influence in policy-marking. The explanation for these elements of continuity and change 
are explained by cost-benefit exchange theory. However, these exchanges are also 
historically and ideationally conditioned, a theme explored more fully in this article. 
2. All translations from the original French are by the author. 
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